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NEGLIGENCE and PROXIMATE CAUSE
SOME ELEMENTARY OBSERVATIONS
(Continued from January Issue )
We now come to the two rules or tests of the existence
of causal relation which are now most frequently used by
the courts. The first of these, which we shall call the "narrow rule," affirms that the wrongdoing defendant is liable
for all the natural and probable consequences of his act.
The second, the "broad view," because by its application
the defendaht's liability may be increased, provides that the
wrongdoing defendant is liable for all the natural and proximate consequences of his act.
What is the judicial interpretation of the first, or
"narrow," rule? What is meant by "natural" and "probable?"34 These terms are not used synonymously. "Natu(N. B.-This article reprinted by permission of The Cornell
Law Quarterly.)
34In speaking of such terms as "natural," "probable," "proximate," "remote," etc., Mr. Greene, in 8 Am. L. Rev. 518-519, says,
"Now all these expressions are vague: they mean little; and in
the majority of instances in which they are employed they probably mean nothing. No person who uses one of them, if asked
what he means by it, can give a well-defined explanation. Such
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ral'" apparently means "without unusual departure from the
ordinary course of nature,"-" or "not surprising in the light
of average human experience'"'r
"Probable," as used in
this connection, is admittedly a word of indefinite import.
Some courts seem to view a "probable consequence" as one
which a man of ordinary prudence would have foreseen or
anticipated under the same circumstances.3 7
The rule is
often called the "'foreseeability" or "foresight" test of
causation.
On the other hand, some courts and writers as
define a "probable consequence" as a consequence not unlikely to happen. By this is meant that a wrongdoing defendant is liable for the consequences which would have appeared to a man of ordinary prudence as not unlikely to
happen, which is simply another way of saying that a probable consequence is one which a man of ordinary prudence
would have foreseen or anticipated. In the final analysis,
then, probability means foreseeability. It is true, a wrongsentences are not a solution -of a difficulty; they are stereotyped
forms for gliding over a difficulty without explaining it. When
a court says this damage is remote, it does not flow naturally, it
is not proximate; all they mean, and all they can mean, is that
under all the circumstances they think the plaintiff should not
recover. They did not arrive at the conclusion of themselves by
reasoning with those phrases, and by making use of them in their
decision they do not render that decision clearer to others. The
employment of such phrases has never solved one single difficulty."
3540 Am. L. Reg. (n. s.) 85; Mitchell v. Clark, 71 Cal. 163
(1886.)
369 Col. L. R. 136, 139.
37"The true rule is that the injury must be the natural and
probable consequence of the negligence-such a consequence as,
under all the surrounding circumstances of the case, might and
ought to have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as likely to flow
from his act." Hoag v. L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293, 298
(1877.) See similar language in Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 475 (1876;) Perry v. Rochester Lime Co.,
219 N. Y. 60 (1916.) See criticism of last case in 2 Cornell Law
Quarterly, 250. See good exposition of this rule in Meyer v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. Co., 116 Wisc. 336 (1903.)
3825 H. L. R. 103, 116.
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doing defendant should be liable for foreseeable (probable) consequences. 39 Whether the converse is always true,
viz., that the wrongdoing defendant is not liable for unforeseeable (improbable) results, is debatable, 39a although
many courts attempt, not without difficulty, to apply strictly
the foreseeability test in its -affirmative and negative form. 40
The second, or broad, rule of causal relation, that a
wrongdoing defendant is liable for the natural and proximate consequences of his act, requires explanation of some
of its terms. We have noted the meaning generally given
"Proximate" results are said to be
the word "natural."
those which follow in natural, unbroken sequence from the

wrongdoing of the defendant without the intervention of a
more predominating or more efficient cause, whether those
39

As we saw, supra, in dealing with the establishment of negligence, defendant is under a duty to avert foreseeable harm by
the use of due care. Of course he should be liable for results it
was his duty to prevent.
392 See arguments against foreseeability as a test of causation, infra.
4OThe majority of American jurisdictions adopt this rule.
See cases cited in 22 R. C. L. 120, fn. 18. This is the rule used
by the N. Y. courts. See Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 219 N. Y.
But in New York an arbitrary exception has been
60 (1916.)
made in the case of the spread of fire, started or maintained negligently by defendant. There can be recovery only for the burning of the first premises ignited, even though further spread of
the fire was reasonably foreseeable. The courts admit the limitation is arbitrary but justify it on the ground that a contrary rule
would often bring financial ruin upon defendant. See Ryan v.
N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210 (1866;) Hoffman v. King, 160
N. Y. 618 (1899.) A similar decision in Kerr v. Pa. R. R. Co.,
62 Pa. 353 (1870,) has been overruled by Pa. R. R. Co. v. Hope,
80 Pa. 373 (1877,) which holds that defendant is liable for any
spread of fire, reasonably foreseeable by a man of ordinary prudence. The limitation of the N. Y. courts is not the general rule.
See Milwaukee, etc., Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 (1876;) Hoyt
v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181 (1874;) Fent v. Toledo, etc., Ry., 59 Ill.
349 (1871;) Smith v.London, etc., Ry. Co., L. R. 6 C. P. (Eng.)
14 (1870.)
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results could have been foreseen or not. 41 This test rejects
foreseeability as a criterion to determine causal relation.
As was said by Mitchell, J., in Christianson v. Chicago,
etc., R. Co.:42
"This mode of stating the law (the foreseeability test
of causation) is misleading, if not positively inaccurate. It
confounds And mixes the definition of "negligence" with
that of "proximate cause." What a man may reasonably
anticipate is important, and may be decisive, in determining whether an act is negligent, but is not at all decisive in
determining whether that act is the proximate cause of an
injury which ensues. If a person had no reasonable ground
to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in
any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not
be negligent at all; but, if the act itself is negligent, then the
person guilty of it is equally liable for all its natural and
proximate consequences, whether he could have foreseen
them or not. Otherwise expressed, the law is that if the
act is one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated, was liable to result in injury
to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have foreseen the
particular injury which did happen. Consequences which
follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural
and proximate, and for such consequences the original
41

See for expressions of this rule, 1 Street, Foundations of
Legal Liability, 111 and 116; 40 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 80, 158; 1
Beven, Negligence (3rd Ed.,) 88-90; Smith v. London, etc., Ry.
Co., supra, note 40; Harrison v. Berlley, 1 Strob. (S. C.) 525
(1847;) Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251 (1875;) Ill. Cent. R. R. v.
Siler, 229'Ill. 390 (1907;) McKee v. Harrisburg Traction Co., 211
Pa. 47, 50 (1905;) Boggs v. Jewell Tea Co., 266 Pa. 428, 432
(1920;) Christianson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 97
(1896.)

42Supra, note 41. All the authorities in note 41, supra, contain similar expressions.
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wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have
foreseen the particular results which did follow."
The natural and proximate rule may be called the
"hindsight test,"'4 because, unlike the natural and probable test, which looks from the wrongdoing forward to inquire if the result was foreseeable, it views the result after
it has occurred and inquires whether a more predominating
cause than the defendant's wrongdoing has intervened to
break the causal chain of events between defendant's
wrongdoing and plaintiff's injury.
It will at once be recognized that the defendant may be

subjected to greater liability under the broad view, according to which foreseeability is not a criterion of legal cause.44
Cases may arise which have identical facts. The courts of
one state may hold the defendant liable by applying the
broad rule, 45 and another court may hold the defendant not
liable on identical facts, because it uses the foreseeability
test of the narrow rule.46 The distinction between the two
rules of causation is often overlooked and courts have often

in the same opinion used both rules interchangeaby, 47 or
431 Beven, Negligence

(3rd Ed.,) 89, note 2.
41n Wood v. Pa. R. R. Co., 177 Pa. 306 (1896,) defendant's
negligently operated locomotive struck a woman who was crossing the track near a station. The impact threw her body a considerable distance. In falling, the body struck and injured the
plaintiff. The court held the defendant was not liable because
the injurious result to plaintiff was unforeseeable. If the court
had used the "broad rule," there is no doubt but that the court
would have found defendant liable.
45E. g., in Kuhn v. Jewett, 32 N. J. Eq. 647 (1880,) defendant's negligence caused oil to be overturned and ignited. The
burning oil was carried some distance by a stream of water to
Plaintiff recovered
plaintiff's premises, which were destroyed.
damages.
4fIn Hoag v. L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293 (1887) the
facts were exactly the same as those stated in note 45, supra. The
Pa. court, using the foreseeability test, held plaintiff could not
recover.
47E. g., see Pa. R. R. Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373 (1876;) Haverly
v. State Line, etc., Ry. Co., 135 Pa. 50 (1890.)
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have decided one case according to one rule and another
case by the use of the other rule. 4 8 This, of course, creates
confusion in the minds of those who read the courts' opinions and who have failed to carefully analyze, so far as it
is possible, the question of legal cause.
Both rules have consistent followers among the courts
of last resort, although there is a tendency toward the
adoption and use of the broad rule.4 9 If a choice must be
made, even though we admit that neither rule thoroughly
solves the problem, which is more defensible on principle?
If one will carefully read and weigh the arguments of the
proponents of both rules, he must admit that the "natural
and proximate" rule is preferable.
In the first place, it is submitted that in using "foreseeability" in determining legal cause, such an attempted definition of legal cause is confused with the definition of negligence. 50 It will be remembered that the foreseeability of
harm of some kind (i. e., in the abstract) to the plaintiff is
the criterion by which negligence is established. If a man
48

Hoag v. Railroad, supra, note 46, uses the narrow test.
McKee v. Harrisburg Traction Co., supra, note 41, states the
broad rule.
49This is so in Pa. Most of the earlier cases use the narrow
rule, but in McKee v. Harrisburg Traction Co., supra, -note 41,
the court said, "True, when an act is clearly negligent one may
be held liable for its unforeseen consequences, however remote,
which follow in the natural sequence of events." See also Boggs
v. Jewell Tea Co., 266 Pa. 428, 432 (1920;) Gudfelder v. R. R.,
207 Pa. 629 (1904.)
In Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363 (1891,) the court said
the defendant would be held (presumed) to have foreseen whatever consequences might ensue from his negligenc without the
intervention of some more predominating agency. The court
evidently tried to harmonize the broad and narrow views by raising a conclusive presumption of foreseeability.
5oSee quoted statement of Judge Mitchell, supra( note 42,
and expressions of similar import in the authorities cited in note
41, especially those of Beven, Bohlen and Street, who are vigorous
advocates of the broad rule.
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of ordinary prudence would have foreseen harm of some
kind to the plaintiff, defendant is negligent if he fails to
use due care to avert the harm. Having in this manner
established defendant's negligence, should he be held liable
only for those harmful results which could reasonably have
been anticipated? If his conduct was negligent and damage
has ensued, why should the defendant be entitled to claim
that the test of foreseeability should be applied a second
time, and even more minutely, to shield him from bearing
the full consequence of his proven negligence? When the
foreseeability of harm has been used to establish negligence,
the subsequent use of the same test to determine causal
relation is simply a confusion of the two distinct questions,
viz., the establishment of negligence, and the determination
of the existence of causal relation. 5
Next, it is submitted that the "natural and probable"
rule is too liberal to a negligent defendant. If the defendant has been found negligent, he is a tortious wrongdoer.
Why should-his liability be limited to those results which
were reasonably foreseeable? If the negligent defendant
is a wrongdoer, should he not be liable for all the results
of which his negligence was a substantial and predominating cause, even though those results might not be foreseeable? Should the defendant know, or be presumed to
know, beforehand, for what results he will be liable if he
is negligent? Is he entitled to that consideration as against
the injured plaintiff? It is urged that a milder rule should
be used to fix causal relation in negligence than in other
torts. The courts which use the "probability" or "foreseeability" test will make exception to it. In the following
classes of cases they will hold the defendant liable for results, even though unforeseeable, in the producing of which
51"The measure of defendant's duty in determining whether
a wrong has been committed is one thing, the measure of liability
where a wrong has been committed is another." Holmes, J., in
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co., 172 Mass. 488, 491 (1899;)
and see authorities cited in note 41, supra.
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the defendant's wrong was a substantial factor: where the
defendant's wrongdoing was criminal;5? where defendant's
act was consciously wrongful ;53 or, where defendant actually desired a result that was improbable and unforeseeable
by a man of ordinary prudence.5 4 In the cases mentioned
liability of the defendant is not dependent on foreseeability
of results. But the causal effect of defendant's wrongful
act is not increased because he had a particular state of
mind or desire.5 5 His merely negligent act, without the
desire for a given result or without the wrongful intent, is
just as powerful in its causal effect. The state of mind may
subject defendant to punitive damages, but it should not
affect the question of determining the existence of legal
cause. Courts do not, therefore, apply the foreseeability
test consistently. As far as the causal effect thereof is concerned, no distinction should be made between negligence
and wilful or conscious wrongdoing.
It is also argued that it would be unjust and harsh to
the defendant to extend his liability beyond reasonably
foreseeable consequences."' This argument entirely ignores
the hardship of compelling the plaintiff to go uncompensated for the damages he has suffered, simply because the
negligent defendant could not foresee the harm.
"It may be hard to mulct the wrongdoer in damages for
results which the normal man would not anticipate, but it
is more unjust that the person injured by the breach of duty
52

Sedgwick, Damages (6th Ed.,) pp. 89, 99, 129.
v. Crouse, 127 Mich. 158 (1901,) defendant held
liable for unforeseeable result of spread of fire which he wrongfully started in a blacksmith's shop to keep himself warm after
53Wyant

breaking into the shop.
54Suppose defendant threw a stone at a crowd of people

with a desire to hit one of them, though they were so far away
that neither defendant nor any prudent man could suppose he
could throw that far. The desired, though unforeseen, result
actually happens. There is no doubt as to defendant's liability.
'See 25 H. L. R. 223, at pp. 228-230.
511 Sutherland, Damages (3rd Ed.), sec. 12.
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imposed for his protection should not recover for all the
loss which has in the ordinary course of nature been caused
to him by the wrong because the wrongdoer (while able to
foresee that some harm was likely to result) could not foresee the full effect of his act ..... the loss to the plaintiff is
as great, his right to recover should be as certain, if the
loss be a natural result of the wrong, whether the defendant
intended the whole damage to result, or should have known
it would occur, or could not possibly foresee the extent of
57
the consequences of his act."
Further inconsistency in the foreseeability test may be
shown. All courts, even those using this test, will agree
that the defendant should be liable for the direct results of
his wrongdoing, i. e., those results which occur at the time
8
of the wrongdoing, while it is still in operation.A
If the
result occurs immediately, no other cause intervenes, and
the only pr-oducing cause is the defendant's wrongdoing.
That defendant should be liable for such results, even
though unforeseeable, is an unescapable conclusion and is
admitted by courts which champion the foreseeability test.5"
Is there any basis for distinguishing between an unforeseeable direct result and an unforeseeable indirect result? The
wrongdoing may be just as potent in producing one as the
other.
The "natural and proximate," or broad, rule of legal
cause does carefully distinguish the two separate questions,
the establishment of negligence and the determination of
the existence of causal relation. It gives equal causal effect to all kinds of wrongdoing, negligent, wilful, or conscious. The causal effect of a wrongful act does not in57Prof. Bohlen in 40 Am. L. Reg. (n. s.) 80.
5
SSee Wardlaw, J., in Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strob. (S. C.)
525 (1847).
59E. g., Armstrong v. Montgomery Ry., 123 Ala. 233 (1898),
death resulting from slight laceration of hand; Balto. Ry. v.
Kemp, 61 Md. 74 (1883), cancer resulting from slight blow due
to negligent operation of defendant's car.
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crease with the moral turpitude of the wrong. The application of the broad rule is usually more just to the plaintiff,
although it may occasionally seem unjustly harsh to defendant. As between the parties, the plaintiff is entitled to
any considerations of this kind.6The broader test is a
consistent rule for determining liability for either direct or
indirect results.
Under this rule, it will be remembered the defendant
will be liable for all the results which follow from his wrongdoing in natural, unbroken sequence without the intervention of a more predominating, more efficient cause, whether
the results could have been reasonably foreseen or not. A
rule, similar in substance, has been formulated and proposed by a learned writer,6 1 as follows: the defendant is
liable if his wrongdoing was a substantial factor in producing the damage complained of. "Substantial" is said to
mean "continuously efficient."
The effect of the wrongdoing or some active injurious force induced by it must have
appreciably continued down to the time of the damage.
Either statement provides the same test to determine legal
cause. It is immaterial whether we say that defendant's
wrongdoing must have been a substantial factor in producing the damage or that defendant's wrongdoing is the legal
cause if no other more predominating or more efficient
cause (i. e., substantial factor) intervened. If no more
efficient cause has intervened, defendant's wrongdoing is
at least equally the legal cause and he should be liable.
Greater difficulty is encountered in applying either the
broad rule or the narrow rule, where other causes have
intervened between the wrongdoing of the defendant and
the plaintiff's harm. It may be well then to observe the
intervening causes which are generally held to be more efficient causes than defendant's wrong and those which are
60

"Does not sound policy require that the risk should be
thrown upon the wrongdoer instead of the injured party?" Christiancy, J., in Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 553 (1863).
OJeremiah Smith, 25 H. L. R. 303, 310.
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generally held not to break the causal chain. We shall note
whether it would have made any difference in the results
reached if the broad rule or the narrow rule had been used.
The causes which are most frequently set up as intervening
causes may be roughly classified in groups, as follows: acts
or forces of nature, acts of animals, acts of the plaintiff,
acts of third persons.
It is uniformly held that the causal connection is not
broken by the intervention of the ordinary forces of nature.6 2 This is so whether either the broad or narrow test is
used. Under the latter test, an ordinary force of nature is
reasonably foreseeable by a man of ordinary prudence,6s
and under the broad view the ordinary force of nature is not
considered a more efficient or more predominating cause
than defendant's negligence.64 On the other hand, if the
intervening cause is an extraordinary, unprecented and abnormal force of nature, the defendant is not liable. This
is so, if the "natural and proximate" test is used, on the
ground that an extraordinary force of nature does not follow in a "natural"65 sequence of events, and that it is a more
predominating cause than the defendant's wrong. However, some courts which use the broad rule have disagreed6 '
notes 63 and 64, infra.
Derry v. Flitner, 118 Mass. 131 (1875); Romney Marsh v.
Trinity House, L. R. 5 Ex. (Eng.) 204 (1870); Scott v. Hunter,
46 Pa. 192 (1863); Haverly v. State Line, etc., Ry. Co., 135 Pa.
62See

63

50 (1890).
64Kuhn v. Jewett, 32 N. J. Eq. 647, 651 (1880); Harrison v.
Berkley, 1 Strob. (S. C.) 525 (1847).
65The courts assume that an act of nature is unnatural if it
is abnormal. "Unnatural" is here used in the sense of "unusual."
66
Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 130 Ia.
123 (1906), defendant negligently delayed plaintiff's goods at X
and they were there destroyed by an unprecedented flood. Defendant was held liable. Accord, Michaels v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co.,
30 N. Y. 564 (1864). It is submitted, even though the intervening extraordinary force of nature is unforeseeable, defendant
should be liable if his negligence was a substantial factor in producing plaintiff's harm. The weight of authority, however, is

128 "

DIcKINsON LAW REVIEW

If the narrow, or foreseeability, test is used, of course defendant is not liable, because an unprecedented force of
nature is not reasonably foreseeable. However, under
either rule, the defendant will be liable in spite of the intervention of the extraordinary force of nature, if the same
result would have occurred if the force of nature had been
ordinary and the fact that it has been extraordinary has
only hastened the injurious result.67 In other words, to exempt the defendant from liability, the "extraordinariness"
of the extraordinary force of nature must have been the
substantial cause and not merely an accelerating condition.,,
The intervening acts. of animals, when the animal acts
in the way such animals ordinarily act, will not break the
causal connection between defendant's wrongdoing and
plaintiff's harm.6 9 This is so, whether the broad7o or narrow rule has been applied.
The acts of plaintiff which are usually set up as intervening causes are his instinctive acts and his volitional acts.
As to intervening instinctive acts of the plaintiff, when
the plaintiff has been put in a position of peril created by
the defendant's misconduct, and instinctively does an act
to protect himself from injury, but which unfortunately results in harm to himself, this act is not deemed an efficient
contra to the Iowa case above.

See Rodgers v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.,

75 Kans. 222 (1907); Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. 171 (1852);

Denny v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 13 Gray (Mass.) 481 (1859).
67
E. g., see Ulrick v. Dakota Loan & Trust Co., 3 S. D. 44
(1892); Helbling v. Cemetery Co., 201 Pa. 171 (1902); Elder v.
Lykens Valley Coal Co., 157 Pa. 490 (1893).
68

in B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. School District, 96 Pa. 65 (1880),
the intervening extraordinary force of nature was, on this
ground, properly held to break the causal connection and defendant was held not liable.
69
See cases cited in 29 Cyc 503, note 25. The fright of animals and their resulting acts usually intervene.
7
0E. g., see Sneesby v. L. & Y. Ry. Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. (Eng.)
263 (1874).
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would act instinctively to protect himself and in such a case
the defendant's wrongdoing is at least an equally predominating cause. Under the narrow rule, such an act on the
part of the plaintiff is reasonably foreseeable.
If plaintiff is in a position of peril created by defendant's
wrongdoing, he may act with some deliberation in attempting to save himself. His volitional act in an effort to save
himself is not an efficient intervening cause, if he has acted
as a man of ordinary prudence would have acted12 This
is so under either rule of causation on the grounds mentioned in the last paragraph. If plaintiff's volitional effort
to save himself is not that of a man of ordinary prudence,
he would be denied recovery by the doctrine of contributory negligence.73 Likewise, when a third person's life is
imperiled by defendant's wrongdoing, plaintiff's volitional
effort to save the other will not prevent the plaintiff from
recovering for the injuries sustained by him in his life-saving
effort. 74 But plaintiff's volitional effort to save his own
7'Vallo v. Express Co., 147 Pa. 404 (1892).
In this connection, the fright of the plaintiff intervening between the defendant's wrongdoing and plaintiff's physical injuries resulting from fright will exempt defendant from liability
for such injuries, if plaintiff suffered no bodily impact. See
Mitchell -v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107 (1896); Ewing v.
R. R., 147 Pa. 40 (1892); Ward v, R. R., 65 N. J.. L. 384 (1900).
Contra, that there may be recovery for injuries resulting from
fright caused by defendant's negligence, see Purcell v. St. Paul
City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134 (1892).
72Tuttle v. Atlantic City R. R. Co., 66 N. J. L. 327 (1901);
Quigley v. Canal Co., 142 Pa. 388 (1891); Twomley v. R. R., 69
N. Y. 158 (1877).
730f course, if plaintiff's failure to use due care in his own
conduct is a substantial factor in producing his injury, the defendant, though negligent, is not liable. See Burdick, Torts (3rd
Ed.), p. 490.
74Eckert v. R. R., 43 N. Y. 502 (1871); Corbin v. Phila., 195
Pa. 461 (1900). "Such conduct (of plaintiff) was not negligence,
but heroism."
Omaha, etc., Ry v. Krayenbuhl, 48 Nebr. 553
(1896). It is said that plaintiff's conduct in such cases must not
be rash or precipitate.
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property or that of another from a position of peril created
by the defendart's wrong must be that of a man of ordinary
5
prudence.7
intervening cause. 71 This is so held under the broad view
of causation on the ground that it is natural that plaintiff
If the plaintiff's volitional act intervenes after the peril
created by defendant's negligence has passed, plaintiff cannot recover. Plaintiff's own act is the legal cause. So also,
if plaintiff's intervening act is done with intention to aggravate his injuries, he cannot recover for the aggravation.7 6
Passing to the intervention of acts of third persons, we
find still more difficulty in determining the existence of
causal relation. The acts of third persons which usually intervene are instinctive acts, negligent acts, deliberate inter-

meddling, wilful and consciously wrongful conduct.

The

case of Vicars v. Wilcocks 77 held that the wrongdoing de-

fendant could not be liable for plaintiff's injury when the
wrongful act of a third person intervened. The trial judge
claimed the fact that plaintiff had a remedy against the
"later" wrongdoer constituted per se a sufficient reason for
denying him a remedy against the "earlier" wrongdoer.78
The rule of
This view has been rapidly disappearing.
in
cases
similar in
followed
only
Vicars v. Wilcocks is now
facts and its decision as prevailing authority has been narrowed to this: the originator of a slander or libel is not liable
for damages resulting from an unauthorized repetition by
7 9"
third persons.

75Wasmer v. D. L. & W. Ry., 80 N. Y. 212 (1880); Siler v.
R. R., 229 Ill. 390 (1907); Liming v. R. R., 81 Ia. 246 (1890).
In such cases, plaintiff's attempt to save property is not encouraged by the courts when it subjects him to grave personal harm.
Morris v. R. R. Co., 148 N. Y. 182, 186 (1898).
7(Daniels v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 183 Mass. 393
(1903); Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. (N. Y.) 288 (1902).
778 East (Eng.), 1 (1806).
78
See for similar fallacy, Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kellogg,
94 U. S. 469, 475 (1876).
- 9Shoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N. Y. 12 (1900).
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As to intervening instinctive acts of third persons, it is
now uniformly held that the instinctive effort of a third person to escape a situation of peril created by defendant's
negligence will not break the causal chain, and defendant
is liable."' This is equally true under either view of causation. Under the narrow view, the defendant could reasonably have anticipated such conduct on the part of a third
person, and under the broad view, the wrongdoing of the
defendant is still 4 substantial factor in producing the result in spite of the intervening conduct, which, in fact, was
directly induced and caused by defendant's wrong.
The intervening negligent conduct of the third person
may have been induced by the wrongdoing of the defendant
or may have occurred independently of defendant's wrong.
If the defendant's wrong has created conditions interfering
with the third person's enjoyment of property or exercise
of rights, the latter's intervening negligent conduct in removing these conditions will not free the defendant from
liability to the injured plaintiff."' The negligent conduct
of the third person in extricating himself or his property
from peril wrongfully created by defendant will not break
the causal chain. 82 Likewise, the negligent efforts of a
stranger to make safe a condition which was created by defendant's wrong and which is dangerous to the public or
3
some class thereof, are not efficient intervening causes.1
The negligent defendant is liable if strangers act negligently
S"The best known authority is Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. B1.
(Eng.) 892 (1772). "His acts, under the circumstances, arc in
law regarded as would be the movements of an inanimate object
set in motion by such negligence." Jackson v. Galveston Ry. Co.,
90 Tex. 372, 376 (1897).
s'Collins v. Commissioners, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. (Eng.)
(1878); Fishburn v. Railway Co., 127 Ia. 483 (1905).
&2Chambers v. Carroll, 199 Pa. 371 (1901).
83

Henry v. Dennis, 93 Ind. 452 (1883).
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In all
in assisting plaintiff injured by defendant's wrong."
these cases the intervening negligence of the stranger was

induced by the defendant's wrong.

The defendant should

reasonably have foreseen it and he is therefore liable under

the narrow rule.

And he is certainly liable under the broad

view. The intervening negligence is not more predominating in its causal effect than the defendant's wrong, especially
since the latter caused and induced the former.
Negligent donduct of third persons, intervening independently, i. e., not induced by defendant's wrong, their
deliberate wrongful intermeddling, and their wilful and con-

sciously wrongful or malicious conduct, both of which, of
course, are not induced by defendant's wrong, have all received practically like treatment as intervening causes.8 '
It is generally held that none of the three kinds of tortious

conduct on the part of third persons will break the causal
chain, if the third person's tortious conduct could have been
reasonably foreseen by a man of ordinary prudences" This
doctrine has been uttered by courts which adopt the broad
view and usually reject "foreseeability" as a test of causal
relation.7 This may be the result of a confusion of the establishment of negligence with the determination of legal
84Wallace v. Pa. R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 556 (1909).

A third person's total failure, though culpable, to remove a
condition of peril created by defendant's wrong does not exempt
defendant from liability. Galvin v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 112 N.
Y. 223 (1899).
8:It has been held that the wilful tort of a later wrongdoer,
if not foreseeable, will always break the causal connection. See
Holmes, L. J., in Sullivan v. Creed, (1904) 2 Irish R. 317, 356.
This idea is literally acceptable.
8
6Sullivan v. Creed, supra, note 85, third person's negligent
conduct; Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136 (1872), third
person's deliberate intermeddling; Marshall v. Caledonian Ry.
Co., 1 Scottish Session Cases, 5th see., 1060 (1899), third person's criminal conduct.
S-Glassey v. Worcester, etc., Ry. Co., 185 Mass. 315 (1904),
'defendant held not liable because third person's intermeddling was
not reasonably foreseeable.
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cause. If a man of ordinary prudence would have foreseen
in his conduct harm to the plaintiff resulting only though
the subsequent tortious conduct, negligent, deliberate or
wilful, of a third person, then it was defendant's duty to
use due care in his conduct to avert harm of that general
kind. Thus the foreseeability of the tortious conduct of a
stranger may be necessary in establishing negligence. 81
Then of course, if the foreseeable result occurs, defendant
should be liable, for he has permitted by his failure to use
care the result which it was his duty to avert. And this is
so under either the narrow or broad test.
But suppose the defendant's negligence has been established by the foreseeability of other harm, or he is guilty
of wrongdoing other than negligence. The foreseeability of
the stranger's tortious conduct was not necessary in establishing defendant's negligence. The courts which ordinarily
use the broad test should not then inconsistently say that'
defendant is liable only if the third person's tortious conduct was reasonably foreseeable. The defendant, a proven
wrongdoer, should be held liable, whether such intervening
conduct was foreseeable or not, if the defendant's wrong is
6f such a nature and has such a continuing effect that a jury
could find that it was a substantial factor, at least an equally
efficient or predominating cause, of the injury complained of.
In conclusion, an attempt has been made simply to
state with as much clarity as possible the fundamental principles or rules and their subsidiaries which are used, or
have been used, in establishing negligence and in determining the existence of legal cause; to show the distinctions
between the various rules, inconsistencies in them, and
S8 In the Glassey case, supra, note 87, it is submitted that no
harm was foreseeable. Therefore, defendant could have been
held not liable on the ground that he was not negligent. The
question of causation was unnecessarily discussed.
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criticisms of them with the hope that the reader may, when
the occasion arises to use or express them, do so with a
clearer and more analytical understanding.
FRED S. REESE.

IN MEMORIAM
LEWIS STERRETT SADLER
Lewis Sterrett Sadler was born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania on March 3d, 1874, and died on January 21st, 1922.
He graduated from Dickinson School of Law with the
Class of 1896. He was a son of Honorable Wilbur Fisk
Sadler, to whose vision and initiative the establishment
of the school must be chiefly attributed. He practiced
law for a few years in Carlisle; but upon his election to
the presidency of the Farmers Trust Company, he devoted himself to the upbuilding of that institution and
to public affairs. He acted continuously as the president
of the Farmers Trust Company from the date of his election until the time of his death. For some years he was
a trustee of the Carlisle Hospital, and at the time of his
death he was vice-president of its board.
During the World War he served as executive manager of the Pennsylvania Council of National Defense
and Committee of Public Safety, an office which he filled
with great distinction and in which he exhibited such
characteristic energy, executive ability and patriotic enthusiasm that in January, 1919, he was chosen Highway
Commissioner of Pennsylvania. From this date to the
time of his death he supervised the expenditure of nearly
seventy-five millions of dollars on the upbuilding of the
highways of the State.
Governor Sproul has characterized his service in this
office as follows: "Lewis Sadler was one of the finest
public servants I ever knew. He was energy and efficiency personified. The great system of public highways
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in Pennsylvania is his monument. Absolutely unselfish
and untiring in his desire to serve, he devoted himself
incessantly to the duties of his great post. He had the
confidence of the people to a marked degree and everyone admired his wonderful conception of the great undertaking which he had planned and oarried out. I mourn
the loss of a true friend, a splendid official and a noble
and patriotic citizen of the Commonwealth."
When the project of the Alumni to erect a new building for the Dickinson School of Law was proposed, -he
was one of the most liberal contributors to the building
fund. He was one of the trustees of the corporation and
a member of the executive committee of the Alumnl
Association of the School. "He was earnest, loyal and
notably sincere in all his relationships."
The School has lost a wise counsellor, one of its most
valued friends, and an alumnus of whose short but distinguished career it is justly proud.
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AMES vs. THOMPSON
Instruments--Guaranty--Statute of Limitations

STATEMENT OF FACTS
X made a note for $400 payable "on demand after
date," dated April 11, 1910. On the back of this note Thompson
wrote, "I hereby guarantee payment of this note," and signed
the words. Partial payments were made by X, the last of which
was made on July 17, 1918. $225 remains unpaid. This is assumpsit on the guarantee. The defense is the Statute of
Limitations.
Fortney for the Plaintiff.
Heefner for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FISHER, J.-The question of cardinal import in the case at
bar is whether or not the contract, which is the subject of litigation, is one of suretyship or one of guarantyship, for on that
hinges the liability of the defendant.
A guarantor undertakes that another sball pay a debt or
perform a duty and such other person remains primarily liable.
On the other hand the surety undertakes to pay the debt or perform the obligation if the debtor fails to do so. And this no matter what the debtor's ability to pay may be. The sheer default
gives the creditor recourse to the surety, and the surety in turn
has certain rights against the principal debtor. Another criterion
for determining the character of the obligation is the time at
which liability is incurred. The liability of the surety arises simultaneously. with that of his principal, or at the time of contracting the debt; while a guarantor only incurs liability when his
principal has defaulted. For an authority to substantiate the
forgoing statement of the law the court cites, Reigert vs. White52 Pa. 438, which says, "In case of default the guarantor is secondarily liable, while a surety is equally liable with the principal."
The learned counsel for the plaintiff inferentially says that
most likely this note was endorsed by Thompson after the making
thereof, or some time between April 11, 1910, and July 17, 1918,
thus endeavoring to deprive the defendant of the necessary statutory period of six years. It is the opinion of this court -that the
inference is wholly unwarranted by the common custom of the
commercial world. Ordinarily the surety or guarantor attaches
his signature to a note at the same time the principal debtor
does.

DIcKINsON LAW REVIEW
The note which X, as maker, gave to Ames was "payable on
demand after date." The surety incurs his liability when the
note is due and this being a demand note Thompson's liability
arose immediately after the making thereof. In Bousted vs. Cuyler-116 Pa. 551, "A note payable on demand is evidence of a
present debt and is due and demandable immediately." And in
MeBeth vs. Newlin-15 W. N. C. 129, and Hartley Silk Mfg. Co.
vs. Berg-48 Sup. 419, "An undertaking that payment of another's debt shall be made when due was construed to be a contract of suretyship."
Having established the contractual relationship in this case
one of suretyship we find the law to be, as declared in Clark
vs. Burn-86 Pa. 502, "A surety's obligation arises at the time
the contract is made and his rights cannot be affected by subsequent acts of the principal debtor which would prevent the running the Statute of Limitations."
The fact that the principal debtor made payments up to July
17, 1918, which was within six years previous to the beginning
of the action, and thus prevented the statute in..ring to his benefit, could not prevent the statute being set up by Thompson as a
bar to the action, because Thompson's liability began on April 11,
1910, and no matter what may have been the ensuing acts of the
principal debtor they could not prevent Thompson's liability from
ceasing on April 11, 1916, the statutory period.
In view of the foregoing interpretation of the law, and in
the light of Mr. Justice Frazer's decision in Homewood People's
Bank vs. Hasting in 263 Pa. 260, judgment must be entered for
the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
If Thompson's contract was one of guarantee, it cannot be
enforced, since the condition on which it was suspended, viz: The
inability of X to pay it, has not been shown.
But the contract, despite the use of the word guaranty, must
be regarded as that of a surety. People's Bank vs. Hastings-263
Pa. 260. Thompson bound himself to pay the note "on demand
after date," that is, virtually at once.
The time of payment could not be changed for him by any
act of the payee, or the maker of the note. While, by accepting
partial payments, the payee prolonged the time which had to elapse
in order to bar recovery by the statute of limitations, as respects
the maker, he did not affect the liability of Thompson. It became unenforceable by the statute of limitations, at the end of six
years from the making of the note. 263 Pa. 260, Supra.
The decision of the learned court below is approved.
AFFIRMED.
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COMMONWEALTH vs. JACKSON
Crimes-Aggravated Assault-Intent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jackson driving an auto truck furiously along a street, collided with an automobile in which Jenkins was riding, upsetting
it and permanently injuring Jenkins. This is an indictment for
aggravated assault and battery.
Jacoby for the Commonwealth.
Glass for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KOLANSKY, J.-There is only one criterion by which the
guilt of man is tested. It is whether the mind is criminal and the
mind is criminal when man is actuated by an evil intent. However, there is little distinction, except in degree between a positive
will to do wrong and an indifference whether wrong is done or
not. When this indifference to the rights of others causes one t3
become careless and negligent with the result that someone is injured, then the question of intent which invariably occupies one
of the two luminary positions in criminal law, becomes subsidiary
to the presumptious which arise in every case.
While it is a general rule in criminal proceedings, at common law, that a defendant cannot be convicted unless a criminal
intent is shown, it is not necessary that he should have intended
the particular wrong which resulted from his act. As to nature
of intent nothing more is required than an intentional doing of an
act which by reason of its wanton or grossly negligent character
exposes another to personal injury and causes such injury.
Com. vs. Hawkins-157 Mass. 551. Defendant is indicted
for aggravated assault and battery.
An assault is an attempt or offer with force and violence to
do a corporal hurt to another. II. Bishop on Criminal Law, 48.
A battery is a consummated assault.
At common law in order to convict of aggravated assault,
there must be an act upon which aggravation supervenes and with
which it is in some way connected. 3 Cyc. 1026.
An intent to injure is an element of assault and battery
(Com. vs. Brungess-23 Pa. Co. Ct. 13), but when injury is inflicted, intent to injure is presumed. Smith vs. Com.-100 Pa.
324; 3 BI. Comm. 121, note 18; Com. vs. Randall-4 Gray 38.
The necessity of intent as an element of aggravated, assault
and battery is dependent on its necessity in assault, for the assault is the original offense and the means,-the intent,-and
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extent to which it is carried qualify only aggravation of original
offense.
State of Iowa vs. Cokely-4 Iowa 478.
Since the intent to injure is always inferred from the act,
(cases cited supra., also State of Iowa vs. Myers-19 Iowa 517),
of assault and battery, it will also be inferred in aggravated assault and battery, unless it is an aggravated assault in which a
specific intent is a necessary element of the crime, as in assault
with intent to inflict great bodily harm.
State vs. Richardson-162 N. W. 28 (Supreme Court of
Iowa).
In State vs. Campbell-14 Atl. 927, defendant was convicted
of manslaughter.
"One who with a reckless disregard for safety of others, so
negligently drives an automobile in a street as to cause death of
another is guilty of manslaughter.
Following case reported in II. Bishop on Criminal Law, 392,
note 3.
If a man being on horseback which he knows to be used to
kick, wilfully ride him amongst a crowd of persons and the horse
kick a man and kill him, the rider is guilty of murder although he
had no malice against any particular person, not any other intention than -that of diverting himself by frightening persons around
him.
Since every battery includes an assault (3 BI. Comm. 120),
and every murder includes assault and battery (Hartman vs.
Com-12 S. & R. 70, establishes principle of merger of felony and
misdemeanor when one is a constituent of others) had not the
victim, of defendant's folly, in case supra., died from the kick of
the horse defendant clearly would have been convicted of aggravated assault and battery. His knowledge of the propensity
of horse to kick, was sufficient to indict him, when he brought
that force (the horse) in contact with the rights of others. Surely
one who directs every movement of a force (the automobile)
which is also destructive should more clearly be convicted.
The Act of March 31, 1860, IPurdon 907, makes assault, aggravated when a person unlawfully and maliciously inflicts upon
another either with or without any weapon or instrument any
grievous bodily harm.
Malice as used in above section of act means an unlawful
act injurious to another, done wilfully or recklessly without justifiaction or excuse.
Com. vs. Scanlon 2 County Court (Pa.) 605.
If injury is recklessly and wilfully done, the law will presume malice.
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Smith vs. Com.100 Pa. 324.
The above act does not include intent. The rule of common
law would then govern and from cases cited could be inferred
from act.
State vs. Cawley-67 Vt. 322; case of Com. vs. Coccodralli74 Sup. is on all fours with case at bar.
Judgment on verdict.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The defendant, Jackson, intended that his truck should move
at an excessive rate, a rate which caused it to be a more than ordinary and legitimate danger to others. He would not have done
this if he had had a due sense of this danger, and a proper desire
not to expose others to it. He had the will to produce the "furious"
speed; he had not the will to save pedestrians and others from
the involved risk. The will which he had, accompanied by the
absence of the other will, was a state of mind which may be
named malice. Jackson had a defective humanity, and an exorbitant desire for self satisfaction, despite danger to others.
He has driven a piece of matter against the body of Jenkins,
and has injured it. His act was a battery; the manner of doing it
was malicious, though the particular injury to Jenkins, or indeed to anybody, was not foreseen. That some such injury
might happen should have been foreseen, and an altruistic sentiment strong enough to resist the impulse "furiously" to drive the
truck, should have been in his mind. Cf. Commonwealth vs. Coccodralli-74 Supr. 324.
The conviction, then, was proper, and the judgment is
AFFIRMED.

HARRISON'S ESTATE
Administration-Rights of Creditors-Rights of Heirs

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harrison died owing debts equal to $20,000 and leaving two
-farms. On one of these he lived at his decease. The other was
in possession of a tenant whose rent was $400 a year. The administrator petitioned the Orphans' Court: (1) To be authorized
to collect the rent from the leased farm. (2) To be allowed to
make a lease of the other farm and apply the rental to the debts.
The heir is in possession of this farm.
Coover for the Plaintiff.
Durnin for the Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
BISHOP, J.-This defendant left debts amounting to $20,000 and no personal property-however he had two farms, one
under lease for $400 a year, the other upon which he lived up until the time of his death is now in the possession of his heir at law.
We have no evidence as to just what this secured farm would
rent for, it is possible that may rent for more than $800 if that
is so then all collected in excess of $12,000, which would be the
interest on these $20,000 worth of debts, could go yearly to reducing the principal. It is more likely that it might not bring even
$800. However that might be it would be a long time before all
the debts would be paid-the heir would have to wait a long time
before the estate would be settled up and in the meantime the fees
of an administration would be slowly eating away the value of the
estate which would go to the heir after the debts were all paid.
The creditors likewise would have to wait for their money and
hence would suffer great hardship and inconvenience.
It has been earnestly contended by the plaintiff that this case
comes under See. 14 of the Fiduciaries Act which in substance
gives the Orphans' Court power to grant permission to the administrator to collect rents from the real estate, under lease,
where personal estate is insufficient to cover the indebtedness of
the deceased. It is also contended that by construction of the
court in 263 Pa. 248, Reed's Estate, power should be granted
administrator to rent the other farm. We would not presume to
differ with the Supreme Court on a matter res adjudicata, nevertheless, we think that the case at bar differs essentially from the
case before the court under that decision. There the rental was
much larger and the amount of the debts much smaller than in
'this case. The whole estate could have been settled up in q comparatively short time. Here no one can say when the estate
will be settled up under this plan of the plaintiff's, that it will be
settled at all is doubtful.
It surely was never the intention of the legislature to allow
the matter of the final settlement of a decedent's estate to hang
fire forever; in fact its intention was strongly expressed the other
way.
It must be remembered that the court in matters such as this
is permitted to exercise its own discretion to a very large extent
and we believe it to be well within the wise discretion of this court
to bring this case under Section 16 of the Fiduciaries Act, whizh
gives to the court power to authorize a sale of real estate when the
personal estate is insufficient to pay the debts of a decedent. We
feel that the administrator should have proceeded under this sec-
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tion of the act to get such a decree from the court-if, however, he refuse
to act we recommend that the creditors petition the court for a rule to
show cause why the administrator should not act and thus force him to act.
The petition of the administrator is refused.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Under the Fiduciaries Act, creditors of the deceased may cause a sale
of his land to be made when the personaltyis "insufficient," and they may
also cause the rents to be collected by the executor or administrator. The
latter power has been conferred by that act. Previously, the heir or devisee could collect and appropriate all the rents, until a sale was made and
confirmed by the Orphans' Court, a processthat sometimes involved much
delay. Under that act, both right to collect rents until a sale, and the
right of sale coexist.
It may be that the'executor is not acting wisely in asking for leave to
collect rents, rather than to sell. But we cannot see that the Orphans,
Court has the right to prevent a step necessary to secure, for the creditors,
the rental value of the lands until a sale of them is consummated. To refuse the order to collect the rents, is to deprive the creditors of the rents
that under the Act of 1917, they are entitled to. They have the right, on
petition, to have appropriated to their debts, not only the rents accruing
under leases, but the rental value of the tract which was not under lease,
but in the possession of the heir.
The decree of the learned court below must be set aside, the petition
of the administrator must be reinstated with a procedendo. Cf. Reel's
Estate, 263 Pa. 248.
Decree set aside.
LIFE INSURANCE CO. vs. TIPPLE
Insurance-Validity of Policy Surrendered Under an Agreement
on a Presumption of Death
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Tipple's life was insured for $10,000, his wife being
beneficiary in the policy. Alter Tipple had been absent from home
for seven years and not heard from, the Company paid the $10,000 to Mrs. Tipple but took from her a bond for the repayment of
the money should it thereafter appear that John Tipple was alive.
Within a few weeks Tipple returned, but suddenly became ill anti
died. This is a suit on the bond, for $10,000 and interest. The
death of John Tipple occurred while the policy would have been in
full life, had it not been surrendered at the time of payment.
Rasbridge for the Plaintiff.
L. Morgan for the Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
R. M. MORGAN, J.-John Tipple was absent from his home
and unheard of for seven years and a presumption of death was
raised. As both parties believed him to be dead the policy was
terminated by the payment of the policy to Mrs. Tipple, the defendant, who in return gave a bond whereby she was to return
the money should it thereafter appear that John Tipple was alive.
He returned home soon after the money was paid and the wife
was bound to return the money. If the facts of the case stopped
at this point there would be no doubt but that the Insurance Co.
could recover upon the bond, but it happened that within a short
time after his return he became ill and died.
The policy which had been cancelled after the seven years of
silence would have, if it had been permitted to run, been in full
life at the time of Tipple's death. Both parties were mistaken in
believing him to be dead and it was only upon this mistake of fact
that the policy was terminated. If such had not been the case
the policy would have continued in force and the premiums paid,
and upon his death his wife would have been entitled to the
$10,000.
It.was held in Gross vs. Leber, 47 Pa. 520, that relief would
be granted against the consequences of a mistake of fact. And
where both of the parties believed the insured to be alive, and
upon the strength of that belief a $6,000 life policy was surrendered for a $2500 full paid policy about a week after his
death, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to have the policy
reinstated as of the date of its surrender. Reigel vs. American
Life Insurance Company, 153 Pa. 134.
In this case there has been a mutual mistake which was the
cause of the surrender of the policy, and where, as in the case at
bar, the policy may be reinstated without violating any of the
terms of that policy should and do give that relief. The defendant by the reinstated policy is entitled to the $10,000 but she
must pay the premiums and the interest from the date of the surrender to the death of the deceased.
Judgment for the defendant subject to the payment of the
unpaid premiums and interest.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
We are unable to accept the view of the learned court below
that the bond for $10,000 was giver in consequence of a common
mistake of fact, and therefore, was voidable. Both parties acted
on the theory, as says Potter, J., in Ancient Order of United
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Workmen vs. Mooney, 230 Pa. 16-19, that John Tipple might be
alive. It was to provide against his being alive that the bond was
given. The bond, we think, was valid.
But it has happened that Tipple died while the policy would
have been in full effect had it not been surrendered. We think
we must treat the surrender as contingent on the failure of John
Tipple to die during its life. He has actually died, and the policy
is therefore enforceable. We see no objection, then, to a set-off
of the $10,000 recoverable on the policy against the $10,000 payable upon the bond, plus the interest thereon, for the time between the actual payment, and the time when, death happening,
payment should have been made.
The result reached by the learned court, though on a different theory, is substantially the result that a correct theory would
have required. The judgment, therefore, is
AFFIRMED.
COMMONWEALTH vs. JAMISON
Burglary-Alibi-Evdence-Credibility of Witness
STATEMENT OF FACTS
"Jamison is on trial for burglary. X, one of his witnesses,
testified as to an alibi. Respecting this testimony the court told
the jury: 'If you find any nzaterial falsehood in X's testimony,
it is your duty to discard all his testimony. If false in one thing,
he would not hesitate to be false in all things, according to the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.' Verdict guilty. Motion
for a new trial."
Carter for Commonwealth.
Collins for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HUTCHISON, J.-We are of the opinion that the court below erred in its charge to the jury. Whether or not testimony
is to be disregarded is a question of fact and is based on the
credibility of a witness. Question of fact is to be tried by jury
and it is not for the court to give instructions as to matters of
fact.
Commonwealth vs. McManus, 143 Pa. 64.
Though the presumption that a witness has testified to truth
may be removed by proof that he has testified differently, it belongs to jury to weigh such evidence to determine credibility of
witness.
Alexander vs. Buckwalter, 17 Sup. 128.
Even if the court was within its rights in giving such an instruction, the instruction was incorrect. There is no rule of law
which requires a jury to disregard or discard all of the testimony
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of a witness even if they should conclude that he has testified
falsely as to some particular material fact in the case. A witness may testify falsely as to some particular under an honest
mistaken belief. In such cases the jury should not be authorized
to disregard .all of the testimony of that witness. 29 Sup. 454.
The proper instruction to have given the jury in this case is:
"If a witness wilfully and corruptly swears falsely to any
material fact in a case, the jury are at liberty to disregard the
whole of his testimony."
30 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law (2nd Ed.) 1012.
Commonwealth vs. Levine, 74 Sup. 491, adds to the above
stated doctrine the following: "The correct principle goes no
farther than to say that the jury may disregard the testimony
not that they should disregard it."
The specification of error is sustained. The judgment of
the court below is reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
False in one thing, false in all, is a maxim grossly extravagant and absurd. No men have always spoken the truth; does
it follow that they have never spoken the truth?
But let us correct the generality of the maxim by making it
say, one, who in one respect is false in a litigation before a court
and jury, is false in all respects in that litigation. The groundlessness of such an assertion is quite manifest, although the enormity of its absurdity is not so great as in its extended application.
A man may mix truth and falsehood in various proportions,
and though, where the false parts of his testimony are perceived
to be wrong, but the truth of the true parts is not perceptible,
their mixture with the false parts makes all questionable, this is
a fact which jurors may be presumed to know, and it is not necessary, nor should it be permitted, that the court should impose as
a duty, on the jurors, the application of the principles. The
jurors as independent thinkers may apply it; the court may so inform them. But the court should not say that it is their duty, on
discovering some elements of falsehood in a witness' testimony, to
reject the whole of it.
The observations of Mr. Wigmore, (2 Ev. p. 1170) are wise.
The jury knows, unless exceptionally stupid, that if they discover
that a witness is false in some respects, they may, if so constrained by their own minds, disbelieve all that he said, or, often
the same thing, form no belief whatever, as to the truth of the
other parts of his testimony.
If the court talks at all on this matter, it should simply re-
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mind the jury of a right to disbelieve, and not attempt to lay on
their minds a duty to do so.
If false in one thing, the witness, said the court, would not
hesitate to be false in all things; a foolish remark, intended to be
interpreted by the jury as equivalent to saying: If false in one
thing, the witness must be deemed to be false in all. What he
would not hesitate to do is of no pertinence. Cf. Com. vs. Jeradi,
216 Pa. 87; Com. vs. Levine, 74 Supr. 291.
The judgment of the lower, court is
AFFIRMED.
NATIONAL BANK vs. MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Discounting Note Executed Without Authority-EstoppelPrincipal and Agent

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The bank discounted a note purporting to be of the defendant
company, but executed by its treasurer, who had not been formally authorized to make such notes. Defense-want of authority of the treasurer.
Replies:
(a). He has made similar notes, ten in number within a
year, which the company had paid without objection.
(b). Interest on the note had been twice paid without contention that the note was unauthorized.
(c).
The treasurer had repeatedly made company notes to
other creditors and had unquestionably paid them, which fact was
known to the plaintiff when it discounted the note in suit.
McDonough for the Plaintiff.
Kreps for -the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LINS, J.-In Cyc. we find the power of an agent to bind his
principal rests entirely upon the authority conferred upon him
That authority is either expressed, or implied. As to third parties,
the liability of the principal for the acts of his agent is measured
not merely by the authority actually given, but by the authority
essential to the business of the agency, and the authority held out
by the principal as possessed by the agent, or the apparent authority which he permits the agent to assume. No expressed terms
are required to define the agent's powers. The relation of principal and agent implies a grant of the powers necessarily incident
to the purposes of the agency, or which, by established usage,
may properly be employed in carrying out those purposes.-24
Super. Ct. 396.
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The authority of an agent to act for and bind his principal
will be implied from the accustomed performance by the agent of
acts of the same general character for the principal with his
knowledge and consent.-180 Pa. 347. This is really so in the
case before us. We find the treasurer bad not only made this
note in question, but ten similar notes within a year, which the
company had paid without objection, and that he had repeatedly
made company notes to other creditors, which were paid, all
being know to the plaintiff. Can we not infer from the above
acts, that the treasurer was clothed with authority of an agent, to
act for and bind his principal? Then too, when an agent is an
officer of an incorporated company, his authority is sometimes
presumed from his office.-3 U. S. 505.
A person dealing with an agent is bound to ascertain the extent of the agent's authority, and this is particularly the case in
dealing with him for the first time; but this is not the first dealing the plaintiff had with the defendant, for we find that the interest on the note had been twice paid without intimation that
the note was unauthorized. Thus in subsequent dealing he (plaintiff) may assume that the original authority continues, unless informed to the contrary.-24 Super. Ct. 396.
In 161 Pa. 157-Millward-Cliff-Cracker Company's estate, it
was held: "Where the president of a bank accepts for discount
notes of a corporation, knowing them to have been executed in
fraud of the corporation, the bank is estopped from asserting that
the notes were issued in the exercise of an apparent authority in
the treasurer to issue notes, because of the long continued issuance of similar notes which the corporation had duly honored
without objection. But we find nothing in the facts that would
lead us to believe that the bank knew that the note was executd
in fraud of the corporation.
We believe by the above stated facts, the question as to
whether, or not the unauthorized acts of the treasurer constituted an affirmative act on the part of the defendant, can be
answered in the affirmative. And that judgment should be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
It does not distinctly appear that the Manufacturing Company obtained the money by the plaintiff bank's discounting the
notes. Had that appeared, the authority of the treasurer would
have been immaterial. First National Bank vs. Am. Bangor Co.
-229 Pa. 27; Cracker Co.'s Estate, 161 Pa. 157.
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The treasurer was not "formally authorized," that is, by resolution of the board of directors of the corporation. But he may
have been effectively authorized otherwise. Within a year, he
had made ten notes which the plaintiff had discounted, and which
the company had paid without objection. It would not be unreasonable to infer that his making these notes was not objectionable to the corporation.
Interest on the note in suit had been twice paid by the corporation without complaint that the note was unauthorized. This
seems to be a tacit consent that the note was obligatory.
The treasurer had repeatedly made notes to other creditors.
The corporation had unquestioningly paid them. The plaintiff
knew of this fact. From this knowledge, added to its own experience with the ten notes, it could not improperly infer that the
corporation had given authority to the treasurer to make notes of
this class. The defendant could not, after thus misleading the
plaintiff into believing in the power of the treasurer, deny that
power.
As we understand that the learned court below has permitted the plaintiff to recover, its judgment must be
AFFIRMED.

THOMAS vs. HARPER
Action-Method

of Amending Pleadings

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Thomas owned a tract of land which he had never occupied.
Harper, without any understanding with him, went into possession and remained therein for five years. He refused then, on
Thomas' demand to relinquish the possession. Thomas sued in
ejectment and dispossessed him. He now brings assumpsit for the
use and occupation of the land.
Rose for the plaintiff.
Schatz for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCHOENLY, J.-To the plaintiff's statement of claim the defendant has filed an affidavit of defense in the nature of a demurrer raising a question of law as to the form of action. Can a
plaintiff who, by ejectment, has recovered possession of land,
recover mesne profits for the use and occupation by the defendant
during the time of his adverse possession of the land, in an action
of assumpsit?
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In Brandmeiser vs. Pond Creek Coal Co., 229 Pa. 280, and
in Reilly vs. Crown Petroleum Co., 213 Pa. 595, it was held that
a plaintiff in ejectment who recovers judgment against the defendant with whom he had no contractual relation and ousts
him from the premises cannot maintain an action of assumpsit to
recover from the defendant damages and mesne profits for the
wrongful occupation of the land; his remedy is by trespass and not
assumpsit.
In accord with the doctrine of these two authoritative cases
the plaintiff admits that trespass is the proper remedy, citing Allwein vs. Brown, 29 Pa. Super. 381, and prays the court, under
the Act of May 10, 1871 (P. L. 265), to amend the mistake in his
statement of claim as to the form of action.
The Act of May 10, 1871, does give to a plaintiff the right
to amend any informalities in his pleadings before or during
trial. Every court of record has at common law such a power to
allow amendments. There are many cases in which the courts
have amended the form of action when such change effected the
form only and not the substance and introduced no new cause of
action, the theory being that they should be allowed if they work
no injustice to the opposite party.
But in this court it is the recognized mode of procedure to
permit amendments only upon petition setting forth proper
grounds and with due notice to interested parties by means of
rule to show cause why the statement should not be amended.
This was not done in this case, the defendant having received no
notice of the plaintiff's petition for amendment.
The demurrer is sustained and judgment entered for the
defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The case of Brandmeiser vs. Pond Creek Co.-229 Pa. 280,
amply sustains the decision of the learned court below. It is perhaps a pity that the plaintiff may not elect to use a usual remedy
for the recovery of money. Sometimes the courts have generously said that a tort might be waived, and a contract action substituted. The logic of the decision is not clear. The mere fact
that ejectment was used to expel the defendant would not be conclusive that the prior possession had not been permissive. It may
have been known by the plaintiff, and tolerated by him. He had
occupied theland for so long a time as five years. The distance
from tolerance to permission is not so great, and the breach of
clear thinking in electing to treat the defendant as in permissive use and occupation, would not be shocking. Nevertheless,
the learned court below has properly deferred to the law as last
declared by the Supreme Court, and its decision must be
AFFIRMED.

